Yes, I agree that Conscience is a great book! This formed the basis of our conversation in this podcast episode. I must say that I actually like her newer work more than the traditional one on consciousness. I think it added a lot of fresh air into neurophilosophy. Anyway, did you get the chance to listen to any of it? It would be interesting to hear your thoughts. We discussed material that was not included in the book.

> If we ignore the loaded colloquial use of the word...

Be careful perceiving subjective terms ("loaded") as objective (unless I'm misinterpreting your meaning....in which case, never mind / pardon me).

> Stuff that is not deterministic would not be strictly classified as "chaos" in my opinion...

Should not may be more appropriate, considering that we are dealing with human beings here. But again, we're still dealing with the "by definition" phenomenon, or "the word has the appearance of being the thing", particularly at runtime.

> Chaos is the name of an observed phenomena.

Which is fundamentally, an appearance/perspective, as opposed to the phenomena itself.

> Chaos Theory is the name of the branch of science that studies that phenomena.

Aspires to study it, technically.

> Bro what are you smoking...

In this case: ontology and epistemology.

> ...we've studied plenty of chaotic phenomena the whole idea of chaos is that you can have deterministic functions that produce pseudorandom output.

I don't disagree with this, my general beef is that I get the feeling that there is a tendency for people to lean towards the conclusion that random output is necessarily derived from deterministic phenomena, and that this bias is falsely (but not with intent - see: lying vs speaking untruthfully) framed as being ~scientific/logical.

> All of the entire corpus of scientific literature is based on the fact that we haven't found an exception to this rule yet.

This is an ontological & epistemic manner, and is also inherently subjective (but may have the appearance of being objective. See: "we are dealing with human beings here".

> How can you imply there is not significant consensus on this issue?

I don't believe I have done this, have I? If you can quote my text I'd appreciate it, because that would be an error on my part I'd think. I suspect it's simply a standard misunderstanding.

>> I find it odd how seemingly close minded and insular science has become in the 21st century, which is rather contrary to the self-serving self-description of the domain and the actors within it.

> I find it wack how smarmy people can be when they don't understand the basics of what they are talking about.

I think this is a classic subjective vs objective misunderstanding, probably some cultural "colloquial communication" norms are in play as well.

Let's investigate:

>> ....when they don't understand the basics of what they are talking about.

What is it that you believe that I do not understand the basics of?

This just made my list of reads! Thank you for taking the time to write this out and post.

Adding biological impulses, does not define morality. Is the idea that these biological imperatives/impulses become the morality? Procreative impulses come to mind, and morality currently holds heavily in this area. Morality by this, cannot safely be defined by biological impulses. Though, at a root level, everything can be accepted once normalized. Add in outliers for everything.

I saw this post yesterday. Her book Conscience is excellent.

What I like is that Pat is old and established now, totally comfortable with calling out philosophy as an industry and making bold claims about the answers the sciences provide. Her work on consciousness is similar is this regard.

Yes, and as said, her argument was that empathy etc. is a certain "platform for morality" on top of which we also learn social norms. But what I would like to hear people's perspectives on whether there is any value in rooting morality in biological impulses. Or does this undermine morality? I don't think so - but I think many would disagree.

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I believe it's both, like many things it's not a simple one size answer. Nature vs nurture is a good example. Both play a part in the end result.

Having no empathy for a small baby is seen as harmful for care. But that lack of empathy might make it easier to hunt and kill animals that provide sustenance. While too much empathy could inhibit this process.

Abstract: Is morality a social construct or rooted in biology? Patricia Churchland argues that the earliest origins of human morality emerged in mammals and birds due to some cascading effects of being warm-blooded. This cascade begins from the high calorific demands of endothermy. This forces warm-blooded animals to become more flexible in their hunting and foraging strategy, which in turn requires a large cortex. Having a large cortex requires, in turn, immature births, because the cortex is largely built in infancy. This was the first evolutionary pressure that allowed unselfish concerns to evolve (originally, for offspring). Later, the same neurobiology of care is used in a variety of circumstances and allows the kind of flexible and caring sociality that we observe in mammals and birds. In the case of humans, this “platform for morality” is supplemented by two other factors: social learning of moral norms, and social problem-solving within various constraints.

​

[Note: this is a repost from yesterday. The original was removed as I forgot the abstract. However, it generated good discussion, so I thought it worthwhile to resubmit it.]

​

[Another note: Patricia Churchland has been very generous with her time with me and has already answered questions that were raised in similar forums. If you have questions you would like her to answer directly, do drop one in and I will do my best to get a response.]

I was told to post this here. The original title was "The problem with peanut consumption and making life safer for those with severe allergies"

This is something that I have been thinking about for some time, and I believe an argument can be made that we should stop consuming peanuts, primarily to make the world a safer place for those with peanut allergies. This might sound kind of silly to some people, but hear me out.
The reality is that when it comes to allergies severe enough to be deadly, peanuts are pretty clearly the most notorious example. While not the most common allergy overall, peanut allergies tend to be the most deadly of the common allergies, and life is considerably more dangerous for those who are allergic to peanuts. The blame for this inherent danger can be laid squarely on the rest of us, and our usage of peanuts in various forms of food. The fact is, by using peanuts in cooking, confectionaries etc., we are significantly increasing the likelihood of someone with a severe peanut allergy being unwittingly exposed to peanuts, and thus we are contributing significantly to the number of allergic reactions caused by peanuts, and the number of deaths that result from said allergic reactions.
My position is this: consumption of peanuts is not important enough to justify the risk we are subjecting those who are allergic to peanuts to. That is to say, enough people are severely allergic to peanuts to where we SHOULD make the fairly modest sacrifice of simply not consuming peanuts in order to accommodate for these people. We can make the world a much safer place for those with peanut allergies by doing this pretty simple thing, and the "harm" caused by not consuming peanuts is in reality negligible.
This position does raise some questions however. Consider a person who decides to open a restaurant. With regards to serving food that contains peanuts, they have 2 options. Option 1 is to serve dishes that contain peanuts, and option 2 is to not serve dishes that contain peanuts. Taking option 1 may make some customers a bit happier, but it will also considerably increase the chance of any given non-peanut dish being contaminated with peanuts, and thus considerably increases the chance of someone with a severe peanut allergy dying as a result of an allergic reaction to a dish that was supposed to be peanut free. This is a reality that cannot be avoided. This raises the question: is it moral to have these potentially deadly legumes in the kitchen, knowing that this can easily lead to someone's death, and if someone DOES die from an allergic reaction to peanuts, does the restaurant owner's decision to serve dishes that contain peanuts make them morally responsible for that person's death? To be honest, I find it difficult to declare that the restaurant owner is morally responsible in this case. I think the blame rests more on the general public, who create a demand for food containing peanuts. Where there is a demand, there will be a supply. This is a simple fact. I think we as consumers would need to be willing to make the sacrifice of not consuming peanuts in order to make peanut-free restaurants and food manufacturers a reality.
The main objection to this position would be a slippery slope argument. While peanuts allergies are the leading cause of allergy-related deaths, the truth is any allergy can be deadly, and there are so many potential allergens out there that it is impractical to make the world allergen-free. So where do we draw the line? I believe peanut allergies are severe and common enough to where we can draw the line at this point, but I freely admit that this is subjective. Another objection I could see is that while the benefit to an individual person from being able to consume peanuts is negligible, the combined benefit of everyone who is not allergic to peanuts being able to consume peanuts may not be. I obviously don't believe this is the case, but I can at least see this argument being made.
What are your thoughts on this?

Fully agree with the notion of Nature having political and legal standing.... imagine if.... But wasn't the Gaia Hypothesis the faintly Teleological philosophy that the biosphere, atmosphere, hydrosphere and pedosphere all apparently "work together" to create ideal conditions for sustaining life on earth...?

I prefer to wonder if the only reason the Earth Organism tolerates humanity is because we have the potential to redirect asteroids and one day take life interplanetary and interstellar....

Not actively challenging moral rules is basically consensus.

Laws are moral consensus, officially.

Policies are moral consensus.

Granted laws and policies will change be improved upon, but also through consensus.

Not intended as provocation.

Intended as a potential legal argument, to enable legal action and legislation to protect the planet.

One of the major issues with taking polluters to court is the issue of “standing”.

Corporations have “standing”, where individuals opposing their practices do not.

If the argument used in court to make corporations “people”, a decision with which I strongly disagree, for several reasons, could be used to make Nature” a “person”… it would be interesting.

Please do not be offended.

Corporations are legal fictions, illusions. Nature (which we are inseparably part of) exists in actuality. Not sure what you intend for us to imagine from your provocation.

Haven’t had coffee, yet…. But imagine if we extend the model that “corporations are people” to “nature”?

Giving mama nature “legal standing”, as it were….

(Sorry… American, here…. I’ve always wanted to put forth the legal argument that if “corporations are people”, then the owners are literally slaveholders, because corporations cannot make decisions, only the humans who own them can.)

Very interesting. I would surely look into it and share my thoughts, if any.

Making the case for these universal principles is the purpose of my newsletter. I've made a previous argument recognizing the foundational principles of all just societies in the link below. If you have any criticisms, I'd love to hear them so I can address them in future posts.

https://garik.substack.com/p/foundation-principles-and-formal

I greatly doubt that there are such "universal principles" in the first place.

Part of what makes laws reasonable is that they reflect universal principles that free people would accept, which require certain procedural mechanisms and don't presume any substantive conceptions of justice.

It's like saying a fair contract is one where the process is fair, and the outcome isn't substantially unjust. If those conditions are met, the contract is upheld; if not it becomes voidable/void. This is still a weak requirement and reasonable law regimes would encompass every liberal democracy.

I can give you just a short and partial answer (maybe someone else can continue or you can check some of the articles that I linked).

One basic point of Latour is that we should think about social relations, artificial objects and natural things as a part of the same network. He thinks that this insight should have concrete political consequences. Nature should be represented in the political process. I believe he proposes a different way of thinking about relations between humans and their environment, and also new political arrangements in which scientific knowledge of nature and climate change would play a bigger role.

That's a pretty biased way to describe 'reasonable'.

What reasonable people could agree to. Although this is more procedural fairness than substantive.

So long as rights are generally protected, the rule of law is respected, a functioning democratic process is in place, and the outcome isn't blantanly unjust, laws are reasonable (although not necessarily ideal).

I agree with everything you're saying. Two things to add to this:

Rosenberg brings up the Euthyphro Dilemma only to eschew it at the end. Are things good (from our perspective) because of our emotional reaction to them or do we have a positive emotional reaction to them because they are good (or seem good to us)?

Additionally as is often the case with this kind of moral relativist argument there's an implicit turn towards moral realism at the end which contradicts its premises. What authority can his argument have to me if he says we ought not to judge people for holding moral viewpoints which appear abhorrent to us if I accept that the good is simply that which I react positively to? Only if I find the idea of judging people from a non-objective standpoint more abhorrent than I find honor killings could this hold water for me, and I don't think most people would.

Fascinating piece, thanks for sharing.

Good summary! It's always good to be reminded of these (imo healthy) thinking patterns. Personally I can forget them too easily.