Recent comments in /f/philosophy
MarCDgm t1_ismitr4 wrote
Reply to Philip Kitcher argues that morality is a social technology designed to solve problems emerging from the fragility of human altruism. Morality can be evaluated objectively, but without assuming moral truths. The view makes sense against a Darwinian view of life, but it is not social Darwinism. by Ma3Ke4Li3
Gf home, shes being pissy that i am not giving her attention ttyl.
samurai1833 t1_ismiavv wrote
Reply to Philip Kitcher argues that morality is a social technology designed to solve problems emerging from the fragility of human altruism. Morality can be evaluated objectively, but without assuming moral truths. The view makes sense against a Darwinian view of life, but it is not social Darwinism. by Ma3Ke4Li3
He may be right but if human nature is to be totally self absorbed all the time then we would never have civil societies. Without civil standards life would be competitive and exclusionary to the point of failure, just like what happened to Spartans. By the time they realized it they were too late to course correct and were essentially defeated by the Thebians.
No_Bison_3116 OP t1_ismbm9l wrote
Reply to comment by jerfo in Spinoza, Marx and Psychiatry by No_Bison_3116
Yeah, the DSM got worse to the point that the NIMH and Thomas Insel rejected it as pseudo-scientific. So, the DSM is invalid and the DSM categories can't reliably be diagnosed by clinicians. That is the basis idiot :
Published in the journal Neuron, Raymond Dolan—considered one of the most influential neuroscientists in the world—co-authored “Functional Neuroimaging in Psychiatry and the Case for Failing Better,” concluding, “Despite three decades of intense neuroimaging research, we still lack a neurobiological account for any psychiatric condition.”
Reflecting on the more than 16,000 neuroimaging articles published during the last 30 years, Dolan and his co-authors concluded: “It remains difficult to refute a critique that psychiatry’s most fundamental characteristic is its ignorance. . . . Casting a cold eye on the psychiatric neuroimaging literature invites a conclusion that despite 30 years of intense research and considerable technological advances, this enterprise has not delivered a neurobiological account (i.e., a mechanistic explanation) for any psychiatric disorder, nor has it provided a credible imaging-based biomarker of clinical utility.”
In 2011, establishment psychiatrist Ronald Pies, Editor-in-Chief Emeritus of the Psychiatric Times, stated: “In truth, the ‘chemical imbalance’ notion was always a kind of urban legend—never a theory seriously propounded by well-informed psychiatrists.”
Anyway, the onus of proof is not on 'mental illness' deniers but on the people who proclaim it exists with no scientific proof :
There is no evidence for the supposed “science” of psychiatry. There is no test for any mental illness, no proof of causation, no evidence of successful “treatment” that relates specifically to an individual disorder, and no accurate prediction of future cases. Thus, the claim that psychiatric constructs are real disease has not been proven.
Glittering_Rub9385 t1_ismb6x3 wrote
Reply to Philip Kitcher argues that morality is a social technology designed to solve problems emerging from the fragility of human altruism. Morality can be evaluated objectively, but without assuming moral truths. The view makes sense against a Darwinian view of life, but it is not social Darwinism. by Ma3Ke4Li3
IMO, Morality is 95% subjective, what counts as a positive moral construct to some or one person is different from others. There’s no factuality behind any of it. Genetics play a role, but we base most of our morals off of our environment and those around us, especially in heavily populated areas or rural areas. Moral “truths” aren’t “truth” to others, and cannot be proven as a legitimate fact. I do understand what you’re saying, and agree on a few levels but I don’t understand how fact and opinion became so distorted. It just seems like it’s becoming ridiculous with how so much of our “facts” are just based off of opinions and feelings. Facts are irrefutable.
Iamjacksplasmid t1_ism8z2t wrote
Reply to comment by mytwocentsshowmanyss in Philip Kitcher argues that morality is a social technology designed to solve problems emerging from the fragility of human altruism. Morality can be evaluated objectively, but without assuming moral truths. The view makes sense against a Darwinian view of life, but it is not social Darwinism. by Ma3Ke4Li3
I can only speak for myself, but for me it's interesting because it suggests that to make the world a better place, it's not enough to be altruistic, because altruism is fragile and can be destroyed by three selfishness of others. We need to not only be altruistic, but also we need to fiercely defend altruism, because it is a thing that can be lost for most people.
I also think it's interesting that it suggests that altruists might just be people who are naturally predisposed to being more resilient in the face of behavior that makes a person question selflessness. It's interesting to think that some people might just naturally be better at letting shit roll off of them than others, and that difference might be partly biological rather than strictly a matter of mental discipline and stubbornness.
jerfo t1_ism8smg wrote
Reply to comment by No_Bison_3116 in Spinoza, Marx and Psychiatry by No_Bison_3116
On what do you ground such assertions as schizophrenia 'obviously' not existing or a 'non sensical' category? The DSM has changed much in nearly 60 yours from what you quote here. It seems to me you're cherry picking whichever opinions best mirror your own.
jerfo t1_ism7zgq wrote
Reply to comment by No_Bison_3116 in Spinoza, Marx and Psychiatry by No_Bison_3116
I disagree with what you posit here. While some disorders are certainly caused by a diseased capialist system that fails to grant agency and achievemt to the vast majority there are several other diseases which arise independent of whichever socioeconomic framework, i.e. those which have a strong connection to genes (such as ADHD), neurological damage (such as certain frontal lobe syndromes), circuitry disfunction (such as OCD) and so on.
[deleted] t1_ism38b3 wrote
Reply to comment by [deleted] in Philip Kitcher argues that morality is a social technology designed to solve problems emerging from the fragility of human altruism. Morality can be evaluated objectively, but without assuming moral truths. The view makes sense against a Darwinian view of life, but it is not social Darwinism. by Ma3Ke4Li3
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SonnyBoyScramble t1_ism2n1w wrote
Reply to Philip Kitcher argues that morality is a social technology designed to solve problems emerging from the fragility of human altruism. Morality can be evaluated objectively, but without assuming moral truths. The view makes sense against a Darwinian view of life, but it is not social Darwinism. by Ma3Ke4Li3
I find it really difficult to accept that hierarchy could ever ensure any kind of positive morality. It seems, on the contrary, that hierarchy is the mechanism most used by those who have selfishly gained power to achieve amoral, antisocial outcomes. Also, since when is the sacred "good"? There are some pretty massive assumptions here.
Drovbert t1_ism2fa5 wrote
Reply to comment by zedority in Bruno Latour posed a major challenge to modern philosophy’s key assumption - a distinction between the human subject and the world. Philosophy as a field is yet to properly understand the importance of his contribution | Graham Harman. by IAI_Admin
I am not an expert on Heidegger, just reading through Being and Time atm (I have studied philosophy for seven years, sometimes in school sometimes on my own. My main focus is on Nietzsche, but I go to school in English, and nobody teaches 'Continental' stuff here) Some of it makes sense to me, other bits do not. Heidegger's style is obscure and often obtuse, and unreasonably so in my opinion. It is probably cleverer (though not necessarily much less obscure) in German from what I have seen from footnotes, etc. in my translation, but my German is not at all good enough to appreciate it. There is nevertheless, some method to it, even if it means we have to read his works with a solid dictionary in hand which explains the etymological connections which are not readily apparent in a more surface level reading. It is a difficulty I am familiar with however, due to my study of Nietzsche, who knew multiple ancient languages inside and out, and who likewise had a similar understanding of his own German.
I figured Latour would probably object to the centrality of human being in Heidegger, regardless of any subject-object framing of the problem. That makes sense from my 15 min reading of Latour's wiki page. Moreover it is a generally fair objection, even if I would personally disagree with it. It seems to me presuming to approach anything philosophical from the standpoint of an outsider such as a dog or a cat is simply dubious at best, and so we must start from an analysis of human being if we are to get at being in any sense. Certainly it is probable that animals share much in common with humans in their being in the world, but we are far less certain of all the details. Humanity is obscure enough as it is. It would also be fair to level this charge against Heidegger because he seems to presume a commonality between all humans which may at times be in error. Heidegger offers no proofs as to a great number of the insights he offers in Being and Time, instead relying on self examination and analysis and simply hoping that the reader will agree with him. It would also be fair to object to this. Yet deducing things we cannot know from what we do know does seem to me an error in methodology, and Heidegger's creative approaches to circumventing artificial barriers to our knowledge is perhaps the most interesting thing about his thinking.
Heidegger's later work is suspect to me for obvious reasons, and it's been a while since I have examined it, having first encountered his 'Question of Technology' in my second year of university. The last time I have read it was probably six years ago. I remember being impressed by his profound understanding of Aristotle and his grandiloquent doomsaying (we are after all, in grave danger due to technology,) but I am uncertain whether I would agree with the way he thinks about technology today. It probably did not help that the main objection to Heidegger's prophecisations against technology which we studied in that class was Emannuel Levinas' 'Heidegger, Gagarin, and Us,' whose religious framing of the problem and whose emphasis on the human utility of technology as overagainst any environmental concerns, struck me as chauvanistic and vulgar at the time and further galvanised me in favour of Heidegger's approach. I have not read that in years either, however. Today I am also more pragmatic, it is not a god which will save us from nuclear war or climate change or anything else technological, but rather humans, and possibly technology itself, if such saving is possible at all. From what I have seen of the literature most Heidegger scholars seem to argue that he himself is not a Luddite, though he is suspicious of technology. Again however, that was years ago for an undergrad paper. I were to be superstitious I would guess that Heidegger's sentiments against technology are more deeply ingrained in his own personal, romantic view of agrarian living, which beneath all his poetic posturing and profundity is really grounded on the bases of little more than his own parochial nostalgia for the old-fashioned rural communities he grew up in, which may and probably does even boarder on the fascistic.
TMax01 t1_ism14ss wrote
Reply to comment by fineburgundy in Quantum philosophy: 4 ways physics will challenge your reality by ADefiniteDescription
You still don't get it: this is not a discussion about quantum physics, and nothing I have said either denies that QM is weird or contradicts the scientific findings in quantum physics.
Metaphysical uncertainty is still just metaphysical uncertainty, you're just used to being able to dismiss it in classic physics. People love to go on and on about how the human brain is incapable of comprehending "reality" and metaphysical uncertainty is just a psychological limitation of our minds, and then the mathematical undeniability of wave/particle duality or Heisenberg Uncertainty or spooky action at a distance comes along to make it clear that metaphysical uncertainty can't be ignored as easily as you'd like. Scientificism has made you arrogant, and now you're being humbled by science itself, and because you don't like that or the emotional uncertainty of real life, you're transferring your cognitive dissonance onto me.
Thanks for your time. Hope it helps.
VitriolicViolet t1_islxt5n wrote
Reply to comment by odiouscontemplater in Philip Kitcher argues that morality is a social technology designed to solve problems emerging from the fragility of human altruism. Morality can be evaluated objectively, but without assuming moral truths. The view makes sense against a Darwinian view of life, but it is not social Darwinism. by Ma3Ke4Li3
lol to bad 'superior' men are a fantasy Nietzsche invented to cope with reality.
that quote is moronic at best, dangerous at worst. in all of human history the only people who have ever claimed superiority over the rest have been the most inferior of us all.
[deleted] t1_islx437 wrote
Reply to comment by [deleted] in Philip Kitcher argues that morality is a social technology designed to solve problems emerging from the fragility of human altruism. Morality can be evaluated objectively, but without assuming moral truths. The view makes sense against a Darwinian view of life, but it is not social Darwinism. by Ma3Ke4Li3
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[deleted] t1_islwl25 wrote
Reply to comment by [deleted] in Philip Kitcher argues that morality is a social technology designed to solve problems emerging from the fragility of human altruism. Morality can be evaluated objectively, but without assuming moral truths. The view makes sense against a Darwinian view of life, but it is not social Darwinism. by Ma3Ke4Li3
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[deleted] t1_islvj17 wrote
Reply to comment by [deleted] in Philip Kitcher argues that morality is a social technology designed to solve problems emerging from the fragility of human altruism. Morality can be evaluated objectively, but without assuming moral truths. The view makes sense against a Darwinian view of life, but it is not social Darwinism. by Ma3Ke4Li3
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fineburgundy t1_islsjyb wrote
Reply to comment by TMax01 in Quantum philosophy: 4 ways physics will challenge your reality by ADefiniteDescription
It’s advice: if you wish to be engaged, you can’t say “I’m not a physicist but I figured out what they all get wrong about this whole ‘QM is weird’ thing. It’s really quite simple…”
Nobody will take that claim seriously, or at least nobody who knows enough to carry on a conversation about any of this.
Anyway, you get my point or you don’t. I’ll leave the poor equine corpse alone.
mytwocentsshowmanyss t1_islq65q wrote
Reply to Philip Kitcher argues that morality is a social technology designed to solve problems emerging from the fragility of human altruism. Morality can be evaluated objectively, but without assuming moral truths. The view makes sense against a Darwinian view of life, but it is not social Darwinism. by Ma3Ke4Li3
Serious question here as an outsider who has failed to get into philosophy: why is this a fun or necessary topic to talk about? It seems to be a wordy circumlocution around what it means to do the right thing. And it all seems kind of petty and unimportant especially when compared to the very simple idea of do the right thing.
Parking-Mud-1848 t1_islptis wrote
Reply to comment by Daotar in Philip Kitcher argues that morality is a social technology designed to solve problems emerging from the fragility of human altruism. Morality can be evaluated objectively, but without assuming moral truths. The view makes sense against a Darwinian view of life, but it is not social Darwinism. by Ma3Ke4Li3
Not impossible but very difficult. Like the old saying goes no one has ever liberated themselves by appealing to the moral character of their oppressors
D-blue t1_islpb9o wrote
Reply to Philip Kitcher argues that morality is a social technology designed to solve problems emerging from the fragility of human altruism. Morality can be evaluated objectively, but without assuming moral truths. The view makes sense against a Darwinian view of life, but it is not social Darwinism. by Ma3Ke4Li3
Philosophy is like a flour sifter. One sifts and sifts and sifts...no matter how one sifts, the congealed nonsense must be discarded.
Drovbert t1_islnm7s wrote
Reply to comment by throway4r in Schopenhauer and the insatiable will to live | To reduce suffering and forge a better world we must resist desire and our metaphysical individualism. by IAI_Admin
Lol xd. I just realised post is 2 days old tbh it makes sense I have no replies. I feel I am here too late in the end, and not too early. Untimely nevertheless.
throway4r t1_islmxqk wrote
Reply to comment by Drovbert in Schopenhauer and the insatiable will to live | To reduce suffering and forge a better world we must resist desire and our metaphysical individualism. by IAI_Admin
The comment that implores us to pay more attention Schopenhauer is completely ignored, not even a smattering of downvotes, just like Arthur himself, ironic.
Like the madman that lit a candle in the bright morning hours exclaiming: I seek another reader of The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason.
But you have come too early, there are no readers here. Only summary seekers - “Its too long, didn’t read.”
Philosophy is dead and we have killed it.
zedority t1_islmu2q wrote
Reply to comment by Drovbert in Bruno Latour posed a major challenge to modern philosophy’s key assumption - a distinction between the human subject and the world. Philosophy as a field is yet to properly understand the importance of his contribution | Graham Harman. by IAI_Admin
I have not read much of Heidegger, and I did get the impression that Latour was over-simplifying things in his criticisms of other approaches. I've seen Graham Harman (author of the original post, and a philosopher who has spent considerable time arguing that Latour fully deserves the title of "philosopher") claim elsewhere that he found Latour and Heidegger surprisingly compatible, but I have not had time to pursue the details of such a claim.
As near as I can tell, Latour is highly suspicious of the privileging of "Dasein" in Heidegger's work. I'm not sure how strongly related this is to his criticism of the subject/object distinction. It is related to another aspect of Latour's work, which is that no single actor is inherently privileged in any way at the outset (some actors become privileged in some situations, but this is always an outcome of an earlier act, not something that inheres in any "reality-in-itself"). More broadly, Latour strongly insists he is not "anti-modern", which is true insofar as he does not reject the usefulness of science or technology - he simply views dominant accounts of how they work as very problematic. I have read Heidegger's famous "Question of Technology" essay, and I find it very hard to reconcile with Latour's much more pragmatic and anti-essentialist approach.
[deleted] t1_islmgc8 wrote
Reply to comment by [deleted] in Philip Kitcher argues that morality is a social technology designed to solve problems emerging from the fragility of human altruism. Morality can be evaluated objectively, but without assuming moral truths. The view makes sense against a Darwinian view of life, but it is not social Darwinism. by Ma3Ke4Li3
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Drainbownick t1_isllmc2 wrote
Reply to comment by throway4r in Schopenhauer and the insatiable will to live | To reduce suffering and forge a better world we must resist desire and our metaphysical individualism. by IAI_Admin
I really love the Eknath Easwaran translation I have, I wonder what other English translations are considered defining?
valeriesghost t1_ismmcv8 wrote
Reply to Philip Kitcher argues that morality is a social technology designed to solve problems emerging from the fragility of human altruism. Morality can be evaluated objectively, but without assuming moral truths. The view makes sense against a Darwinian view of life, but it is not social Darwinism. by Ma3Ke4Li3
Wouldn’t saying “man hunts food to eat and survive” be about the same thing? We’ve learned how to live with each other without the need to result to violence to resolve problems thus resulting in a longer life span and more offspring, ensuring the continuous of our species. There is no argument here, we compromise to survive. “Morality” is the word we can use to encompass an entire philosophy of life we’ve agreed upon in order to further our life spans. “These are the rules, are you cool with that?” “Yeah, I’m cool with that.” “Cool”
Or
“No, I’m not cool with that and I’ll fight you over it”
Winner dictates new rules, aka, “morality”
This isn’t a breakthrough, merely stating the obvious.
Our fragile ego’s decide what rules we are okay with living by. Our view of what “living” is changes as our standard of living changes. Our entire idea of “moral truths” mean nothing without survival. Survival often means compromising by today’s standards, but a few hundred years ago philosophy meant shit against brute force. Still does. It’s only our collective philosophy as a human species today that says “hey wait, we should talk this over first” and allows for such things as Reddit downvotes instead of absolute death. The title of this article and Philips work could have been summed up as “2+2=4”. All life is a Darwinian view of life, end of story.