Abstract: What is the point of morality? Why should Homo sapiens care about moral rules? Philip Kitcher presents a theory that answers these questions. According to Kitcher, morality stems from something “very deep within us”, namely our psychological dispositions to altruism and other kinds of responsiveness to others. These are biological traits that we evolved as social mammals. However, these traits are fragile. They fail too often to form the basis of human social living. Morality is a social technology that was created to solve these “altruism failures”. Initially, moral rules were very rudimentary, such as the rule not to grab food from others. With time, these rules became more complex. Two virtues of the theory should be noted. First, the theory allows objective evaluation of morality without assuming a realm of moral truths. Second, the theory allows morality to make sense within a naturalist and Darwinian view of life, without succumbing to social Darwinism.
[Note: The referenced theory is discussed in the first 21 minutes of the episode. You can also access the episode via Spotify, Apple Pod, Stitcher, Amazon etc.]

https://thesynchronicity.substack.com/p/how-to-live-in-a-world-that-makes

I would disagree that phenomenology is pure subjectivism. At least I would argue, the phenomenology of Heidegger in particular is not subjectivistic at all. Entities are real beings for Heidegger, and his entire approach is consequently empirical in nature. There is likewise, no problem of the external world for him, because in each case Dasein is already being-in-the-world and cannot be otherwise. In Being and Time, he describes the phenomenological approach as 'To the things themselves' rather than accepting Kant's contention that we cannot know any thing-in-itself

There is no subject-object distinction to be made in his approach, because there is no such thing as a pure subject or a pure object. Things always appear to someone and disappear for someone. To talk of an object as independent from an object of thought is impossible. Yet being that this someone is in every case Dasein, and is therefore caring being-in-the-world, they are never a pure subject, but rather are engaged in the various activities of life of which 'pure contemplation' is only one among many (for Dasein is a caring being, one who cares about being, i.e is mortal, is anxious, and wants to live in the world.) A person necessarily presupposes the existence of a real world, and exists in that world, prior to any philosophical investigation. That world is ready-to-hand and not present-at-hand, i.e, the world is a place of activity and not a big list of things which exist independent of our cares or involvements. So Dasein cannot be a pure subject, because a pure subject without any cares is the only kind which pure contemplation would be possible for. Tranquil contemplation is the mood which is most peculiarly appealing to philosophers and scientists for grounding their ontologies within, but it is only one mood out of many which humans find themselves in. Yet to believe that pure contemplation is the best way of formulating an ontology is in Heideggers view, a mere prejudice of philosophers, and one which precludes them from uncovering certain truths about being which are impossible to acquire within this mood and must be found through other moods. Heidegger famously analyses the case of anxiety (being afraid of nothing in particular) in order to contrast being and nothingness and thereby explain human mortality and finally connect being and time.

To see phenomenology as mere idealism would therefore be an error. Nor is phenomenology solipsism. What the phenomenology of Heidegger appears to me to aim at is the rational analysis of experience and an investigation of existence. "What is being?" is famously the question Heidegger in particular has concerned himself with, and his method of examining human being (being-there) in order to get to being, necessitates an understanding of the existence of others. Being-with, or being with others, is treated in several sections of Being and Time

Nor does Heidegger adopt a position which does not allow for the positing of truths. Truth for Heidegger, is the proper way of pointing out or uncovering beings or being as they are. Entities cannot be true or false, only propositions (or other ways of pointing at them) can be true or false. It is possible to misrepresent things, but things cannot in themselves be a misrepresentation. Beings simply just are what they are. Even the entity which an erroneous proposition is, is itself not true or false but rather the connection it makes is true or false. That I have uttered a falsehood cannot be determined until one examines the thing itself. In the meantime it is simply a proposition, neither true or false.

All this being said, I fail to see how Latour's actor-network theory is at the outset incompatible with the phenomenological approach. Though I have not read Latour, I would tentatively argue that many of his sensibilities seem compatible with Heidegger's. For instance, their shared opposition to Bergson, opposition to metaphysical explanations of reality which act as though there is force in itself, or thought in itself, etc. Likewise, their shared concern with 'delusions' of modernity and technology, their orientation towards explaining entities in terms of the totality of their activities (the world for Heidegger is the totality of involvements of ready-to-hand equipment and Dasein) rather than falling back on essentialism, the empirical approach as opposed to a deductive or rationalist approach, etc.

I am glad others are reading Schopenhauer. In my view he is unfairly brushed over in the historiography, so to speak, of philosophy. He is pushed into the margins in favour of Hegel and the idealists, when he has merit both as an ethicist and as a post-Kantian metaphysician. Though I disagree with many of Schopenhauer's answers, especially those given by his ethics, he at least seizes upon the right problems.

It is quite impossible to justify how little Schopenhauer is read in the Anglosphere, especially considering the degree to which Nietzsche makes use of Schopenhauer. Without a close reading of Schopenhauer, the reader will miss the salience of many aphorisms which respond to specific passages e.g, in World as Will and Representation. Perhaps most importantly with regards to the impact of Schopenhauer on the history of philosophy, Nietzsche's conception of will to power is fundamentally impossible to understand unless one also understands Schopenhauer's will to live.

Finally, it must also be said that Schopenhauer was probably the most influential German philosopher in the late 19th century to 1918. Even 'non-philosophers' such as Erwin Schrödinger were well acquainted with the former's system, and the influence of Schopenhauer on practical sciences, in this case physics, though obscure and hard to quantify, has likely been great.

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Utilitarianism

Humanism

Stoicism

hi everyone, is there any philosophy ideas (name) that encourages that "in life, humans must focus to build or create something", "we are what they create"?

Because That's my idea in life (I like the idea of "positive-sum game" in building a society, and dislike people who do zero-sum game for their life) and I would like to read any other previous philosopher's thoughts (perhaps in the form of book) about it

The essay illustrates the ambiguousness of the relationship between "control" and consciousness (self-determination). The argument is premised on the idea of free will as the foundation of self-determination. That idea (and therefore the premise) is as inexplicable as it is impossible. And so modernists and postmodernists (not to mention also neopostmodernists, which is to say the author and reader alike) are afflicted with both the cognitive dissonance and moral uncertainty (not to say they aren't one and the same, at least in this instance) of the desire for "control" and the unachievable nature of it.

The problem (dissonance/uncertainty) is that the only way to logically prove control is power. And the only way to be morally certain is to have power and not use it unjustly. But injustice is itself a moral perspective.

Morality is not about control, nor is self-determination. It doesn't rely on, relate to, or require control OR power. It cannot. Nevertheless the logical modern position or neopostmodern position demands control, over not just external events but our own thoughts and desires. True morality, and self-determination whether cause or effect of morality, is entirely premised on honesty, both about our desires and the justification for our actions. We are told we should have, or try to have, control, and we don't, even if we have power, and this results in cognitive dissonance.

So by "desire for moral impotence" the author is essentially, though possibly unknowingly, advocating (not merely observing) immorality. (The Trolly Problem illustrates that inaction is as morally hazardous as action, so impotence doesn't really provide the freedom the author suggests.) This amplifies the dissonance and uncertainty, and further it demands that uncertainty is morality and morality must be uncertain. There is a comprehensible "logic" to this, as being uncertain about whether we are being honest or moral is a necessary prerequisite to moral analysis. But it is still ultimately worthless, because impotence is just a poor excuse for lack of control, a semantic game rather than a coherent teleology.

The cognitive dissonance and uncertainty there can be any true morality both (?) disappear, without leaving the immorality or intellectual arrogance the neopostmodernist fears/believes/insists must remain (or be caused by abandoning free will as an explanation of human behavior) simply by properly understanding self-determination. It is not about having control, it is about accurately (and honestly) explaining the reasons for our actions. Assuming brain neuro/psychology explanations are accurate is as immoral as assuming mind social/intention desires are all that ever justify or result in our behavior: a more accurate and exact appraisal/confession is necessary than either binary extreme can support. It is this choosing/deciding whether the past or the future (our neural impulses or our desire impulses) better explain or justify our behavior, in each individual instance rather than as a categorical truth/necessity/morality, which is the cause/reason, the mechanism/logic, and the purpose/result of self-determination.

Thanks for your time. Hope it helps.

That wasn't advice, it was an admonishment, and it was out of place. My advice is you learn how to avoid such situations, and I've offered you good advice for how to do that, which you keep ignoring and yet trying to make it seem like a bad thing I offered it.

Thanks for your time. Hope it helps.

Neither Kierkegaard or Camus pose Absurdity as a question. In their works, Absurdity is not something to understand but to accept; a premise to the questions they explore; life's context and environment.

For Kierkegaard those questions he explores bias towards the creation of meaning, existential dread, and christian virtue. For Camus those questions were on suicide and reason.

While Camus does explicitly tackle Absurdity as a concept, he concluded that the absurd arises from our desire for order and meaning juxtaposed with the indifferent nature of our environment. The Absurd is consequently the context of metaphysics and our relationship with everything other than ourselves. To Camus it is not a life's great challenge to ponder the Absurd, it is life's great challenge to not commit suicide in an absurd universe. To Kierkegaard it isn't a challenge but a feature of the environment to overcome by creating meaning.

>The entire point about evolution is based on a foundation of not seeming to understand how evolution works. Fish didn't will legs on themselves. Carnivorous plants didn't will the ability to trap flies on themselves. The author is attributing desire and action to raw happenstance on that front...

That is one form of evolution, but there are others.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_evolution

Where you also made it about me.

But I have given the advice, taking it is up to you.

>but it remains intriguing to look at a beautiful rose and wonder what forces, or perhaps intelligence, led its stem to be studded with protective thorns that say to the observer, “keep your distance.”

But we already know what force "led its stem to be studded with protective thorns" That force is evolution by natural selection. At some point a mutation led to roses with very minor thorns but those thorns gave the mutated rose a slightly better change to reproduce so eventually the mutation spread through all roses. Then another mutation happened to make them longer and/or sharper until we got modern roses.

>chemical or physiological considerations coupled with mere chance

This is a common misconception about evolution by natural selection. Dawkins talks about this in his book Climbing Mount Improbable. It's not "mere chance". It's "mere chance" (aka randomness) coupled with natural selection that selects adaptations that increase Reproductive Success (RS). But that last part is essential and it is an error to just say "mere chance" results in anything.

>It is nonetheless difficult to set aside the possibility that the fish transformed its fins into legs because it somehow wanted to get out of the water,

The only reason it is difficult to set aside the idea that the fish "wanted" to get out of the water is ignorance of Biology and the fact that people have a tendency to see agency even when there isn't any. That actually is also a result of evolution. If a hunter gatherer hears rustling in the forest the cost of thinking it might be a predator when it is just the wind is far less than the cost (again in terms of RS) of thinking it is the wind when it is actually a predator.

>Schopenhauer offered a number of images to represent the cannibalistic reality of life,

Schopenhauer didn't have the benefit of Neo-Darwinism. In the early days of Darwinism when he lived the thought was that "nature red in tooth and claw" was all that drove natural selection. We know better now. Cooperation and synergy are just as important, especially for social animals such as primates. And synergy doesn't happen just within conspecifics but across species as well. Robert Trivers in his seminal paper on Reciprocal Altruism had several examples such as little cleaner fish that swim into the mouths of much bigger fish (that could easily eat the small fish) but the larger fish let the cleaner fish act as their dentists, cleaning out the little bits of food in their mouths. When the big fish suddenly has to move (e.g., because an even bigger fish like a shark is around) it could quickly shut its jaw and get a little meal but instead it signals to the little fish (via a change in coloring) that cleaning time is over and it's time to get out ASAP which they do.

>Upon realizing that we are all made of Will, a sense of deep guilt about our very constitution follows.

What does it even mean to say we "are all made of Will"? And whatever it means assuming for the sake of argument that it is true why should that make us feel guilty if that's the way nature made us? One of the amazing things about humans is we can override our genetic predispositions (if that weren't the case there would be no market for contraceptives) so assuming we "are all made of will" (again whatever that means) we can change that if we want to.

Also, I don't agree at all that individualism is completely bad. I think it's clearly wrong to take it to extremes the way people like Ayn Rand do but that doesn't mean that individualism is completely wrong. People make scientific discoveries, beautiful art and music even do altruistic acts at least partly because they are driven by a desire to express their individuality. There's nothing inherently wrong with that. At least I find no compelling argument in this article that supports such a conclusion. Just statements that it is true with no real justification.

I do think that there are good ideas in Buddhism. I try to meditate every day and I've found meditation helps me with impulse control, anger management, substance abuse and in general to do a better job of understanding what I really want rather than being driven by short term gratification. But ultimately the reason I do that are at least partly selfish, because I want to lead a better life and part of that better life includes doing research, publishing papers, and getting recognition for my work which to me is an example of how individualism can be a good thing.

Very interesting article. I think it is a very common feeling and something our global society has made ever present, when the tragedies of the world is beamed into our homes on a daily basis.

Ultimately morality is an issue the individual has to come to terms with and control starts there. Breathing positivity into the world is my first step. However small my acts of kindness seem, they are what keeps me going.

Smile to the world and it will smile back!

man i couldn't get past some of the bad examples in this essay:

​

>It costs significantly more than most people think to save a life by donating to the most effective charities — about $2,300. But that’s still only about half as much as the average American spends at restaurants each year.

this is a very poor comparison. restaurants provide food, employment, familial and social engagement which are all critically valuable for a social species. the idea that there's a moral dilemma between eating and saving a life (and that both can't be had) is ludicrous to me.

​

>Imagine your younger sibling is going off the rails – drinking too much and partying too hard. Their grades are suffering. Your sibling doesn’t listen to your parents but they look up to you; you know they will listen in the end. So you know that you, and only you, can intervene and make them get back on track. You can sit them down and have the difficult conversation that neither of you want to have. In other words, you have a great degree of control over your sibling.

i'm familiar with alcoholism/addiction and the idea that "the looked-up-to sibling" can simply sit down and have a talk with an alcoholic and thereby save their life is extremely naïve. not only do people not have that control but it ties in with a common cycle of dependence that makes the problem worse.

there might be more substance to this essay than i can see but, trying hard, i can't make sense out of it.

But to resist any desire is to embrace desire? Seems kinda goofy to me

Yeah, I only took a single survey course and still hated it. I'll stick to E+M and quantum...those are more straightforward.

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I think the mobility point makes sense, but what sort of mobility are we talking about here?

Is it limited to social mobility within a single unified system, or can there be like sideways or orthogonal movements to alternative societies where that particular behavior fits in better?

I think you could achieve the latter through functional boundary rules creating discrete interaction zones. The most rigid (but accordingly simple and very enforceable) rules should apply to these boundary and movement rules, to make sure people can’t be trapped. I’d even permit a voluntary interaction zone of 1.

Once within an interaction zone, the rules could be set by the people within that interaction zone. This allows for a broad range of people to just be who they are, with people who will accept them for who they are, without forcing the same poorly fitting straitjacket on everyone.

I agree somewhat tough to imagine readily implementing now, but if we can get to a point where we can build livable structures out in space, we have a lot of the latter to work with. We could consider and apply interaction zone concepts even now and start taking some baby steps in that direction, thanks to some geographical detachment, which we’ve seen works very well in many contexts during the COVID response.

EDIT: And in terms of the adrenalin junkies that get a kick out of participating in or watching bloodsport, can we point them in the direction of the as-yet unexplored dangers of like the nearest galaxy that isn’t where the people who want to stay safe all the time live? Like it doesn’t even have to be a galaxy away, as long as they’re occupied doing a thing they enjoy, channeled in a way that doesn’t hurt others.

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Mobility

Mobility is prettymuch the main factor in corruption.

Systems that are 'protected' from unwanted behavior decrease mobility in general.

So...

The difference of human nature is the determination of the safeties in place against corruption - prettymuch the only way is cultural identity and unified goals. Culture can only be 'fine-tuned' if there is a definite generality of human nature.

Same as unified goals - which may be even more difficult as the population in question increases - the uniformity of goals shatters or becomes so generalized it loses resemblance to its original meaning.

Examining the claims - we can reason that population of significant size having disparate goals - then would have different decision making for the different factors affecting them. Which - roundabout - is prettymuch the city v the country that we see in general.

Examining once more - aristocratic systems have historically made differences of governance over 'country' and 'city'. In mobility and 'say'. Staying within station etc.

Anyhow

Just saying.

Also, it would be cool if that system could somehow be created - but I really doubt it could given parameters.

The number one problem with the us system is its ease of influence due to cultural proliferation and ideation - schism seems a national pastime - currently leading to a somewhat unprecedented surge of political violence / domestic terrorism drawing overwhelming pushback in governmental interference via legislation in an attempt to mandate culture. Uh... point being, thinking of systems, solving these couple us problems would be fantastic and probably set the way for better systems - like philosopher king societies.

I read the russian lecture book for the exams of the seconds course. I like my books with a bit more math and a bit less hand wavy, but it helped a lot.

The first course was a mess.

I am realizing more and more how very recent the old testament times happened, like the 4 empires of Daniel

Yeah. It was a lot of, "Okay, we don't have any first principles for you, but here's the function that seems to be describing what's going on. Just memorize it." And there were so many patterns, and patterns of patterns to memorize. And it just wasn't fun or interesting to me at all, haha.

Well nuclear physics is kind of a everything goes meeting put because we cant efficiently compute QCD, so it is pretty wild.